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This paper analyzes the effects of symmetric and asymmetric taxation on performance-based 
versus fixed remuneration contracts. I integrate a proportional corporation tax and a 
proportional wage tax into a binary principal-agent model. The wage tax increases the 
remuneration costs and makes the agent's employment less attractive. Thus, the principal 
tends to demand lower rather than higher effort or does not offer a contract at all. In contrast 
to the wage tax, the corporate tax is irrelevant for the optimal remuneration contract. Under 
asymmetric corporate taxation, the principal tends to offer contracts less frequently. Fixed 
remuneration contracts are penalized more heavily by asymmetric taxation than performance-
based remuneration contracts. 
JEL-Code: H250, M410, M520. 
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 Asymmetric Taxation and Performance-Based Incen-
tive Contracts
1 Introduction
Modern corporations are typically characterized by a separation of ownership and con-
trol1. Owners delegate decisions to managers, who are assumed to have expert knowledge
of particular industries or segments of the capital market. Moreover, owners often lack the
necessary capacities or qualications to manage their corporations. For similar reasons,
owners might be unable to supervise corporate managers eciently. Managers who antic-
ipate this lack of supervision could be driven by self-interest, for example, by investing in
unprotable projects (\empire building") or by providing too little eort. Principal-agent
literature suggests to avoid the resulting conicts of interest by oering performance-
related remuneration contracts in order to align the interests of owners and managers. If
owners and managers maximize equivalent objective values, corporate managers do not
have incentives to waste shareholders' resources or to provide sub-optimal eort.
Typically, taxes are neglected in the literature on optimal incentive systems. As a con-
sequence, the impact of taxation on the protability and the optimal design of incentive
schemes has not yet been widely investigated. It is unknown whether corporate taxa-
tion and wage taxation increase or decrease the demand for xed or performance-based
remuneration contracts and how these two levels of taxation aect gross managerial re-
muneration. Given that the current levels of individual income taxation exceed 40% in
many OECD countries2, this research gap is surprising.
Since most corporate tax systems are characterized by loss-oset restrictions, prots and
losses are treated asymmetrically. As a consequence, the eects of asymmetric corpo-
rate taxation are especially relevant for the demand for and the design of remuneration
contracts. The existing principal-agent literature does not address asymmetric taxation.
This paper is intended to close this research gap. In a rst step, I show the impact of
symmetric corporate and wage taxation on the protability and the design of remunera-
tion contracts. The second step is dedicated to the integration of asymmetric corporate
taxation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: After a literature review in section
2 a simple analytical model in the pre-tax case is presented in section 3. In section 4,
I investigate the eects of symmetric corporate and wage taxation on the protability
and on the design of incentive schemes. Section 5 analyzes the impact of asymmetric
taxation. The derived results are claried using numerical examples in section 6. Section
7 provides a summary, draws tax policy conclusions, and gives an outlook on future
research questions.
1See Berle/Means (1932).
2See International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (2010).
12 Literature review
Since the 1970s, one of the main elds of research in the principal-agent literature ad-
dresses problems related to manager-owner conicts. Seminal papers in this eld were
published by Ross (1973) and Jensen/Meckling (1976), for example. Moral hazard prob-
lems constitute an important branch of the principal-agent literature. Holmstr om (1979)
and Shavell (1979) published groundbreaking papers in this area of the literature. Models
with moral hazard3 are typically based on the assumption that managerial eort is non-
observable. Hence, corporate managers tend to provide too little eort from the owners'
perspective. A special case of moral hazard models is given by the LEN model, which
was published for the rst time by Spremann (1987)4. Whereas the original LEN model
was based on a single managerial action variable, further developments include multiple
action variables. Due to the existence of analytical solutions, the LEN model has been
widely discussed, especially in the German-language literature5. However, the model has
been criticized because of its rather restrictive assumptions.
There are few examples of principal-agent models including taxes. Wolfson (1985) exam-
ines the impact of taxation on the lease-or-buy decision in an agency context. Felling-
ham/Wolfson (1985) show that contracts with optimal division of risk are not necessarily
tax-minimizing. Banerjee/Besley (1990) analyze the eects of taxation under limited lia-
biliy. In their model, principal and agent are represented by the scal authorities and the
corporation manager, respectively. They prove that taxation can improve welfare under
market failure due to limited liability. Kanniainen (1999, 2000) discusses whether corpo-
rate taxation can improve eciency by reducing managerial empire building. He shows
that the eciency-improving potential of the corporate tax crucially depends on the risk
of the underlying investment project.
Due to the growing importance of performance-based remuneration schemes, Niemann/Si-
mons (2003) discuss the eects of dierential taxation of corporate prots and managerial
remuneration on the optimal design of stock option plans. They nd that asymmetric
capital gains taxation favors the introduction of stock option plans while leaving their op-
timal conditions unchanged. Brunello/Comi/Sonedda (2006) empirically test a standard
agency model with taxes. They show that the proportion of performance-based remu-
neration decreases with an increasing average tax rate. G ox (2008) studies the economic
consequences of tax deductibility limits on salaries for the design of incentive contracts.
His analysis shows that reward for luck can be the optimal response to tax law changes.
Gupta/Viauroux (2009) investigate the welfare eects of a statutory wage tax sharing
rule. Their results indicate that a rule which species a solution with 100% of the tax
statutorily levied on the employer will maximize eort, expected prot and expected wel-
fare while 100% of the tax statutorily levied on the employee will maximize expected
wages.
3For an overview see, for example, Macho-Stadler/Perez-Castrillo (2001, p. 35 .)
4For a critique of the LEN assumptions see Hemmer (2004). A justication of the assumptions is
provided by Holmstr om/Milgrom (1987) and Wagenhofer/Ewert (1993, p. 382 .)
5See, for example, Wagenhofer/Ewert (1993), Wagenhofer/Ewert (2007, p. 134 .)
2Until now, the analysis of tax eects in agency models was typically restricted to sym-
metric taxation. In a moral hazard model of the LEN type, Niemann (2008) investigates
the impact of a tax system that dierentiates between investment projects with dierent
risks. He shows that symmetric taxation leaves managerial portfolio choice unchanged
compared to the pre-tax case. By contrast, a tax base reduction increases the propor-
tion of risky projects, whereas a tax rate reduction for risky projects induces ambiguous
results, depending on the manager's degree of risk aversion.
In contrast to the principal-agent literature, where taxation plays only a minor role, the
impact of asymmetric taxation under symmetric information has been constantly ana-
lyzed since the 1940s. A seminal paper was published by Domar/Musgrave (1944). They
show that risk taking increases under full loss-oset. By contrast, investors' willing-
ness to take risks decreases with stricter loss-oset limitations. Since Domar/Musgrave,
asymmetric taxation has been an important eld of research in public nance as well
as in corporate nance. Major contributions to the literature are the papers by Bar-
lev/Levy (1975), Eeckhoudt/Hansen (1982), Auerbach (1986), Auerbach/Poterba (1987),
MacKie-Mason (1990), Shevlin (1990), Eeckhoudt/Gollier/Schlesinger (1997), van Wi-
jnbergen/Estache (1999), and Panteghini (2001a, 2001b). From a corporate nance per-
spective, Ball/Bowers (1982), Cooper/Franks (1983), Majd/Myers (1986), Majd/Myers
(1987), and Schnabel/Roumi (1990) point to the call option characteristics of the tax
claim, which can be assessed using option pricing methods.
Due to the path dependence of existing loss-oset restrictions in the context of multi-
period investment decisions, analytical methods of capital budgeting typically do not
provide useful economic insights into tax eects. Therefore, numerical methods are nec-
essary for the valuation of investment projects carrying tax-deductible losses. Monte-Carlo
simulations of loss-oset restrictions were carried out, for example, by Haegert/Kramm
(1977), Majd/Myers (1986), Majd/Myers (1987), Niemann (2004), and Dahle/Sureth
(2008).
3 A binary agency model in the pre-tax case
The binary agency model by Ewert/Wagenhofer (2008, p. 369 .) serves as a starting
point for further analysis. It can be regarded as a special case of the moral hazard model
by Macho-Stadler/Perez-Castrillo (2001, p. 37). In this model, the principal assigns a
task to the agent who is supposed to have special knowledge or special qualications for
this job. Moreover, the principal might be lacking the necessary qualication or is subject
to time restrictions. The principal's prot depends on a random variable as well as the
agent's eort, which cannot be directly observed. The eort also cannot be inferred from
the realized prot. Hence, a forcing contract including a penalty for obviously low eort is
not possible. However, the principal can oer a performance-based remuneration contract
to the agent. For a high prot, the agent receives a high compensation. For a low prot,
the agent receives a low compensation. Designed appropriately, this contract induces the
3agent to provide high eort, increasing the principal's expected prot6.
This binary agency model is based on the assumptions that7
 the principal's prot xi before deducting remuneration costs can only take two
dierent states x2 > x1, with x2 > 0 and x1 2 R8,
 the principal is risk-neutral and hence maximizes the expected prot after remuner-
ation costs,
 the agent is risk-averse and eort-averse,
 the agent's eort ej can only take two dierent values eH > eL,
 high eort eH increases the probability for a high prot compared to low eort eL,
 the agent's disutility of high eort vH exceeds his disutility of low eort vL: vH > vL,
 the agent's utility function U () is additive-separable with respect to remuneration
and disutility of eort: U (si;ej) =
p
si   vj(ej) = ui   vj, with si as remuneration
and ui as utility of remuneration in state i,
 the agent's reservation utility is given by U > 0. In the following sections, analyzing
tax eects requires a separation of the components of reservation utility. Given the
agent's utility function U (si;ej) =
p
si   vj(ej), the wage from an alternative job
sa, and the alternative disutility of eort va, the reservation utility can be written as
U =
p
sa va. For reasons of analytical simplicity, I assume that the disutility from
an alternative employment is zero, so that the reservation utility solely consists of
the utility from the foregone alternative salary. Positive disutilities va > 0 would
just complicate the analysis without providing further insights into the emerging
eects.
The probability distribution of prots and eort levels is given by:
probabilities low prot x1 high prot x2
low eort eL L
1 = 1   L
2 L
2
high eort eH H





i denotes the probability for the prot xi given the eort level ej. For economically
useful results the relation H
2 > L
2 must hold, which implies a decreasing likelihood ratio.
In general, the principal has three alternatives denoted by ak for his optimal employment
and compensation decision.
6A monotonous relation of payo and remuneration is optimal only for monotonically decreasing
likelihood ratios. See Milgrom (1981, p. 386 f.)
7See Ewert/Wagenhofer (2008, p. 369.)
8In contrast to Ewert/Wagenhofer (2008, p. 369), I assume that x1 may take either algebraic sign.
This assumption is necessary with respect to loss-oset restrictions analyzed in section 5.
4a1: The principal can refrain from oering a contract to the agent (default alternative).
In this case, the prots xi cannot be realized, and no remuneration costs are in-
curred, so that the net prot amounts to zero. The value of the principal's objective
function Z equals zero: Z (a1) = 0. This result is based on the assumption that the
technology owned by the principal cannot be managed without employing the agent
and yields zero net returns when left idle. However, for the qualitative results of
this model, it does not matter whether the partial objective function Z (a1) is zero
or a positive or negative constant.
a2: The principal can oer a xed-compensation contract to the agent. This xed
remuneration does not provide incentives for high eort. However, the contract can
be appropriately designed to induce at least low eort. The value of the principal's
objective function can be positive, zero, or negative in this case: Z (a2) 2 R.
a3: In order to motivate the agent to provide high eort, the principal can oer a
performance-based compensation contract. Again, the value of the principal's ob-
jective function can be positive, zero, or negative: Z (a2) 2 R.
The principal maximizes expected prot less remuneration costs by choosing the optimal
alternative: Z = maxf0;Z (a2);Z (a3)g. The value of the partial objective functions
Z (a2) and Z (a3) is the result of an optimization procedure with the remuneration levels
as decision variables to be chosen.9












L as xed compensation for low eort. The agent is willing to accept the contract
only if the participation constraint is met. This constraint requires that the agent obtains
at least his reservation utility and a compensation for his disutility of (low) eort:
uL  vL + U: (2)
In order to maximize the principal's objective function, the participation constraint must
hold with equality: uL = vL + U. If a project generates economic rents, this condition
implies that the principal receives all economic rents. Since only low eort is required
and is already ensured by the participation constraint (2), an incentive constraint is not
necessary for the decision alternative a2. Hence, the principal's objective function is given
by:




2x2   (vL + U)
2 : (3)
For the alternative a3, the partial objective function to be maximized denotes:
max
u1;u2
Z (a3) = 
H
1 x1 + 
H











9This approach was rst presented by Grossman/Hart (1983, p. 33 f.)
5In this case, the participation constraint

H
1 u1 + 
H
2 u2  vH + U (5)
as well as the incentive constraint

H
1 u1 + 
H




2u2   vL (6)
must be met to induce the agent to accept the compensation contract and to provide high
eort. Maximizing the principal's objective function requires that both constraints hold
with equality10. The resulting linear equation system with two equations and two variables
can be solved for u2
1 and u2
























This version of the compensation contract ensures that the agent receives an expected
remuneration that guarantees the reservation utility and compensates for the disutility
of eort. As a result, the principal receives all possible economic rents from realizing a
project. The principal's expected prot after remuneration costs is:


















1 x1 + 
H
2 x2   (vH + U)











The principal chooses alternative a3 only if this objective value is positive and exceeds
the objective value of alternative a2:













 (vH   vL)
| {z }
>0


















This means that the performance-based contract is optimal only if the high prot su-
ciently exceeds the low prot and if the probability for the high prot under high eort
increases suciently compared to low eort. Otherwise, i.e., if the disutility of high eort
10Only in the special case of a binary model is the participation constraint always binding at a second-
best optimum. In models with more than two actions this is not necessarily true. See Grossman/Hart
(1983, p. 15 f., 30.)
11See Ewert/Wagenhofer (2008, p. 371). I assume that negative remunerations cannot occur. This is









, i.e., if the reservation utility is suciently high compared to the disutility of
eort.
6is much higher than the disutility of low eort, the principal does not oer a performance-
based remuneration scheme.
Both the performance-based and the xed-remuneration contract are only protable if
the prots x1 and x2 are suciently high and/or the disutilities of eort vL and vH are
suciently low. Otherwise, the principal chooses the default alternative a1 and does not
employ the agent.
The rst-best case as a reference case emerges for observable eort. In this case, the
incentive constraint can be neglected, because a forcing contract with penalties for low
eort is possible. Thus, the agent always receives a compensation that guarantees a xed




a3 = vH + U (10)
and the principal's objective value amounts to
Z
FB (a3) = 
H
1 x1 + 
H
2 x2   (vH + U)
2 > Z (a3): (11)
Since the principal's objective value increases compared to the second-best case, the high
eort will be requested by the principal more frequently in the rst-best case.
The alternative a2 remains unchanged by observability of eort, because even in the
second-best case, the agent certainly provides the low eort12. In the rst-best case, the
principal is willing to pay the agent for providing high eort only if the following condition
is met:
Z
FB (a3)  Z








(x2   x1)  (vH   vL)(vH + vL + 2U)  0; (12)
i.e., if high eort suciently increases the expected prot or if the dierence of disu-
tilities of eort is suciently low. Obviously, condition (12) is less restrictive than the
corresponding condition (9) in the second-best case. This result is intuitive, because non-
observability of eort only increases the costs of high eort, whereas the default alternative
and the low-eort, xed-remuneration contract are unaected.
4 Symmetric corporate tax and symmetric wage tax
Until now it is an open question which types of compensation contracts are favored or
penalized by the tax system. Moreover, it is not obvious whether the corporate tax
and the wage tax have similar impacts on the frequency and the design of compensation
contracts. To answer these research questions, the following assumptions in addition to
those mentioned in section 3 are used in our model:
 On the principal's level, a corporate tax is levied at the tax rate s.
12See, for instance, Mas-Colell/Whinston/Green (1995, p. 487).
7 The tax base of the corporation tax is dened as the dierence of taxable prots x1




 The agent's remuneration is fully subject to the wage tax levied at the rate t.
 The agent's disutilities of high eort (vH) or low eort (vL) are irrelevant for tax
purposes, because no direct payments are associated with these disutilities.




2 are exogenous and unaected
by taxation.
 The impact of taxation on the after-tax reservation utility Ut is ambiguous. Two
dierent alternatives are taken into account:
1. The reservation utility Ut is unaected by the existence and the level of tax-
ation: Ut = U. This interpretation is appropriate if the reservation utility is
regarded as the result of inactiveness, that means, as a subsistence level that
is either tax-exempt or guaranteed by transfer payments13.
2. The reservation utility Ut depends on the wage tax rate: Ut = Ut (t). This
interpretation is appropriate if the reservation utility is regarded as the utility
from the best alternative employment and if the alternative compensation is
also taxable14. In this case, analyzing tax eects requires a separation of the
components of reservation utility, because the alternative salary is taxable,
whereas the alternative disutility of eort is non-deductible. Given the agent's
utility function U (si;ej) =
p
si   vj(ej), the net wage from an alternative job
(1   t)sa, and the alternative disutility of eort va = 0 as dened in section 3,
the tax-dependent reservation utility can be written as Ut =
p
(1   t)sa va =
U
p
1   t. Hence, the after-tax reservation utility is
p
1   t times the pre-tax
reservation utility.
The principal still has the decision alternatives a1, a2, and a3 as dened in the pre-tax
case. The default alternative a1 does not cause tax payments, because neither prots nor
remuneration costs occur. The objective value of the default alternative in the after-tax
case is still given by Zs (a1) = 015.
In accordance with the pre-tax case, the principal maximizes the expected prot after
remuneration costs and corporate taxes: Z
s = maxf0;Zs (a2);Zs (a3)g.
If the principal would like the agent to provide low eort, i.e., if he chooses alternative
a2, the resulting partial objective function denotes:
max
uL;t











13See Niemann (2008), p. 284.
14Gupta/Viauroux (2009), p. 5 also discuss a tax-dependent reservation utility.
15For a non-zero objective value of the default alternative, the after-tax objective value would be given
by Zs(a1) = (1   s)Z(a1).
8with u2
L;t as the agent's taxable xed gross salary for low eort. Consequently, the agent's
net income after wage tax amounts to (1   t)u2
L;t. Given a prot-maximizing principal,








Obviously, the agent demands a compensation for the wage tax, because only the net
remuneration is disposable for consumption. For a tax-independent reservation utility
(alternative 1, Ut = U), the gross remuneration is increased by the factor 1
1 t compared
to the pre-tax case. If the reservation utility decreases with increasing wage tax rate
(alternative 2, Ut = U
p
1   t), the increase is not as high. However, the necessary gross
salary is still strictly higher than without taxes: u2
L;t > u2
L.
Since the agent always receives only his reservation utility and compensation for his
disutility of eort, the principal collects all economic rents from the project. In return,
the entire wage tax burden is borne by the principal as long as the reservation utility
is tax-independent. Shifting the tax burden onto the agent is impossible, because the
agent would simply refuse to sign the contract. Under tax-dependent reservation utility,
however, the agent bears a part of the total tax burden, because the alternative salary
reected by the reservation utility would also be taxed.
Using the gross salary u2
L;t the principal's partial objective function becomes:












Increasing the corporate tax rate s reduces the principal's objective value, but does not
aect the relative protability of alternative a2 compared to the default alternative. Even
for extremely high corporate tax rates, the algebraic sign of (15) does not change. By
contrast, increasing the wage tax rate t reduces the principal's net prot until Zs (a2)
eventually becomes negative and the principal refrains from hiring the agent. As a con-
sequence, a xed-salary contract might be protable in the pre-tax case, but loss-making
after the integration of taxes. The employment-reducing eects of the wage tax are espe-
cially evident for a tax-independent reservation utility16.
If the principal would like the agent to provide high eort, he chooses alternative a3, so
that the resulting partial objective function after taxes is:
max
u1;t;u2;t




1 x1 + 
H















2;t as the agent's taxable gross salaries for low and for high prot, respec-
tively. Apart from the participation constraint

H
1 u1;t + 
H
2 u2;t =
vH + Ut p
1   t
(17)



























(u2;t   u1;t) =
vH   vL p
1   t
(18)































Similar to alternative a2 the agent demands a compensation for the wage tax. Even
if the reservation utility is reduced by taxation (Ut = U
p
1   t), the wage tax strictly





The reason for this eect is the non-deductibility of the disutilities of eort vH and vL.
If the principal erroneously oers remuneration levels that are optimal in the pre-tax
case, these salaries are insucient to induce the agent to provide high eort in a world
with wage taxation. For (vL + Ut)=
p
1   t < vH + U < (vH + Ut)=
p
1   t, the incentive
constraint is violated and the agent provides only low eort at ineciently high costs.
For vH + U < (vL + Ut)=
p
1   t even the participation constraint does not hold and the
agent refuses to participate. Thus, neglecting wage taxation in the design of compensation
contracts might induce harmful decisions.
Given the optimal state-dependent salaries in the after-tax case, the principal's objective
function is given by:












































The principal chooses alternative a3 only if this objective function is positive and exceeds
Zs (a2):



























Regardless of whether or not the reservation utility is tax-dependent, condition (21) is
more restrictive than the corresponding condition (9) in the pre-tax case. As a result,
there will be fewer performance-based contracts than in a world without taxes. However,
this eect only depends on the wage tax t. The corporate tax s does not aect the
conclusion and the design of a contract.
10The performance-based contract a3 as well as the xed-remuneration contract a2 carry a
wage tax penalty. Increasing the wage tax t may impede employment. Projects which
are protable for the principal, the agent, and the scal authorities under suciently low
wage tax rates will otherwise, under higher wage tax rates, be skipped.
The rst-best case as a reference case emerges for observable eort. Neglecting the incen-











and yields an expected prot after remuneration costs of
Z
FB











> Zs (a3): (23)
In accordance with the pre-tax case, the principal's after-tax demand for high eort
increases with observability.
Comparing the alternatives a2 and a3 in the rst-best case after taxes gives similar results




s (a3)  Z
FB








(x2   x1) 
(vH   vL)(vH + vL + 2Ut)
1   t
 0: (24)
Since this condition is more restrictive than the corresponding pre-tax condition (12), the
wage tax might prohibit the conclusion of a forcing contract with obligatory high eort.
Although the principal's demand for high eort in the rst-best case exceeds the demand
in the second-best case, the wage tax is still an obstacle for employment and eort.
5 Asymmetric corporate tax and symmetric wage tax
Real-world corporate tax systems are characterized by asymmetric taxation of prots and
losses. Whereas prots are subject to the full corporate tax rate, losses do not entitle the
investor to equivalent tax reimbursements. Typically, losses can only be oset against
future prots. This delayed loss recognition corresponds to a limited tax reimbursement.
Technically, tax asymmetries are modeled by using a loss-oset parameter 0    1.
This coecient represents the proportion of deductible losses17. For  = 1 the special case
17In most jurisdictions the use of losses for tax purposes depends on the amount of losses incurred.
Losses that cannot be oset against current prots must be carried forward to subsequent periods, which
induces a negative time eect. The higher a loss, the later it can be oset against future prots. Such
a model specication would require extensive assumptions regarding future prots, which are dicult to
justify in the one-period setting considered here. Hence, I assume  to be constant. Since a one-period
model does not permit the analysis of time eects of taxation, time eects have to be approximated by
tax base eects. See also Ewert/Niemann (2010).
11of symmetric taxation emerges. For  = 0, the future use of losses is entirely prohibited.
More restrictive loss-oset rules correspond to a reduction of . Typical corporate tax
systems have loss-oset coecients 0 <  < 1. As a result, positive prots are subject
to the corporate tax rate s, negative corporate tax bases trigger a tax reimbursement by
using the eective tax rate s.
On the agent's individual level the utility function U (si;ej) =
p
si   vj is not dened
for negative remunerations18. Consequently, loss-oset restrictions do not apply at the
agent's level. Since both the participation constraints and the incentive constraint are
unaected by the corporate tax, the optimal salaries derived in section 4 have to be used




































By contrast, asymmetric corporate taxation aects the principal's objective value. Whereas
the default alternative a1 does not induce tax consequences and is therefore unaected
by loss-oset restrictions19, alternative a2 (request for low eort) as well as alternative a3
(request for high eort) are penalized by asymmetric taxation if the tax base is negative
for at least one of both possible states. For evaluating the principal's objective value a
dierentiation between positive and negative tax bases is necessary.
The partial objective function for alternative a2 under asymmetric taxation is given by:
max
uL;t

































Equation (26) does not exclude negative tax bases and hence negative objective values
for both possible prot levels. In this case, however, the default alternative a1 would be
optimal. Thus, alternative a2 can only be considered if the tax base is positive at least
for the high prot x2. I therefore assume x2 > u2
L;t:

























For x1  u2
L;t the objective value under symmetric taxation from (15) emerges. For
x1 < u2
L;t the principal's objective value after substituting u2
L;t is given by:
Zs (a2) = (1   s)
L






1 + (1   s)
L
2




18Complex-valued utilities are disregarded.
19For a non-zero objective value of the default alternative, the after-tax objective value would be given
by Zs(a1) = (1   s)minf0;Z(a1)g + (1   s)maxf0;Z(a1)g.





































Again, I assume that loss-oset restrictions can only apply in case of a low prot x1 and
are not binding for the high prot, i.e., x2  u2
2;t. Using this assumption excludes two
economically irrelevant cases:
1. A loss after deducting remuneration costs occurs in both states x1 and x2. Then,
the default alternative a1 should be preferred.
2. The dierence of the high prot and the (high) remuneration costs is negative (x2 
u2
2;t < 0), whereas the dierence of the low prot and the (low) remuneration costs is
positive (x1 u2
1;t  0). If this were true, the principal had no incentive to induce the
agent to provide high eort, because the additional prot would be overcompensated
by the higher remuneration costs. Thus, alternative a2 would be advantageous20.
After focussing on the relevant cases, the partial objective function for alternative a3
denotes:

























For x1  u2
1;t the objective function under symmetric taxation from (20) emerges. For
x1 < u2
L;t the objective function after substituting u2
1;t is given by:
Zs (a3) = 
H















Due to the asymmetries for  < 1 a further simplication of this expression is not possible.
Therefore, the impact of corporate taxation on the optimal remuneration parameters
cannot be derived analytically. However, the eects of tightening loss-oset rules can be
described as follows: For any given loss-oset parameter  < 1 increasing the corporate
tax rate s reduces the principal's net prot more than under symmetric taxation ( = 1).
As will be shown numerically in section 6.2, loss-oset restrictions have an asymmetric
impact on the alternatives a2 and a3.
Apart from the varying impact of the corporate tax rate s, direct eects of varying the
loss-oset parameter  can be identied. For any positive probability L
2 > 0 the xed
salary under low eort (alternative a2) exceeds the variable salary under low prot given
a performance-based contract (alternative a3): u2
L;t > u2
1;t. Given the low prot, this






1;t , x1   u
2
L;t < x1   u
2
1;t: (32)
From (32) three possible eects of varying the loss-oset parameter  can be derived:
20A proof is provided in the appendix.
131. x1   u2
L;t < x1   u2
1;t < 0: A loss occurs for both alternatives a2 and a3. The loss
from alternative a2 exceeds the loss from alternative a3. Therefore, tighter loss-oset
restrictions reduce both alternatives' objective values, the reduction being higher for
alternative a2.
2. x1   u2
L;t < 0 < x1   u2
1;t: Given the low prot, a loss occurs for alternative a2
only. Loss-oset restrictions only aect alternative a2, while alternative a3 remains
unchanged.
3. 0 < x1   u2
L;t < x1   u2
1;t: Both alternatives are characterized by positive tax bases.
Loss-oset limitations are irrelevant in this case.
In absolute terms, alternative a2 as well as a3 are penalized by loss-oset restrictions.
Thus, the default alternative a1 benets from asymmetric taxation. Since the possible
loss is higher for alternative a2 it is penalized relatively compared to a3. As a result,
the principal could prefer low eort (alternative a2) under symmetric taxation and high
eort (alternative a3) under asymmetric taxation, because a performance-based contract
might reduce or avoid negative tax bases. As a performance-based compensation contract
shifts risks from the risk-neutral principal onto the risk-averse agent, it contributes to an
inecient risk allocation. As a main result of this model, this ineciency can still be
aggravated by asymmetric taxation.
6 Numerical examples
This section claries numerically and graphically the tax eects derived formally in sec-
tions 4 and 5.
6.1 Symmetric taxation
The tax eects under symmetric taxation are derived formally in section 4. Varying the
corporate tax rate s neither alters the sign of the partial objective functions Zs (a2) and
Zs (a3) nor does it aect the relative advantage of alternatives a2 and a3. By contrast, the
wage tax rate t is relevant for the design of remuneration contracts. For the parameter
setting
x1 = 500; x2 = 1;500; 
H
2 = 0:7; 
L
2 = 0:3; Ut = 24
p
1   t; vH = 6; vL = 1; s = 0:25
the objective functions Zs (a2) and Zs (a3) are strictly decreasing functions of the wage
tax rate t:
14Figure 1: objective functions Zs (a2) and Zs (a3) as functions of the wage tax rate t
The solid line represents the principal's objective function under high eort (a3), the
dashed line shows the principal's objective function for low eort (a2). Both functions
are strictly decreasing in the wage tax rate. Above a critical threshold for t, both partial
objective functions become negative. The principal's objective value for the performance-
based contract a3 decreases faster in the wage tax rate than the objective value for the
xed-compensation contract a2. In our example, the performance-based contract is opti-
mal for the interval t 2 [0; 0.345], whereas the xed-compensation contract is chosen for
t 2 [0.345; 0.945].
Given the tax-independent reservation utility Ut = 20, the results are very similar:
Figure 2: objective functions Zs (a2) and Zs (a3) as functions of the wage tax rate t
15In this case, both objective functions are far more sensitive with respect to variations
of the wage tax rate. The performance-based contract a3 is optimal for the interval
t 2 [0; 0.33], whereas the xed-compensation contract a2 is chosen for t 2 [0.33; 0.449].
Adjusting parameters appropriately results in examples for which either alternative a2 or
a3 in combination with the default alternative a1 dominates the other contract for the
entire tax rate interval [0;1].
6.2 Asymmetric taxation
Under asymmetric taxation of prots and losses the tax eects are not as obvious as
under symmetric taxation and a graphical representation is especially useful. In contrast
to symmetric taxation the corporate tax rate s is relevant for the optimal contract. For
the parameters
x1 = 500; x2 = 1;500; 
H
2 = 0:65; 
L
2 = 0:35; Ut = 25
p
1   t; vH = 5; vL = 1;
t = 0:4;  = 0:7
the following partial objective functions a2 and a3 as functions of the corporate tax rate
emerge:
Figure 3: objective functions Zs (a2) and Zs (a3) as functions of the corporate tax rate s
The solid line represents the principal's objective function under performance-based com-
pensation (a3). For this contract under the given parameter setting, losses do not occur,
implying that loss-oset restrictions are irrelevant. By contrast, the xed-compensation
contract (a2) causes a loss for the low prot x1. Under asymmetric (symmetric) taxation,
the xed-compensation contract is displayed by the thick (thin) dashed line. The inter-
section of the solid line and dashed thick line indicates that the level of the corporate tax
rate has decisive impact on the optimal contract. For s  0:638 the xed-compensation
contract is optimal, for s  0:638 the performance-based contract. Whereas the objec-
tive functions Zs (a2) and Zs (a3) do not intersect the abscissa under symmetric taxation,
16asymmetric taxation might alter the algebraic sign of the objective functions, implying
that higher corporate tax rates may induce the principal to choose the default alternative
a1.
The impact of the loss-oset parameter  was analyzed in section 5. Both the xed-
salary contract and the performance-based contract are penalized by restricting loss-oset.
However, the xed-salary contract suers more from reducing . This eect is illustrated
in the following gure using the parameter setting
x1 =  25; x2 = 275; 
H
2 = 0:66; 
L
2 = 0:34; Ut = 8
p
1   t; vH = 3; vL = 0:2;
s = 0:25; t = 0:4:
Figure 4: objective functions Zs (a2) and Zs (a3) as functions of the loss-oset parameter

The solid line represents the performance-based contract (a3), the dashed line the xed-
compensation contract (a2). The intersection of the functions reveals that loss-oset
rules aect the remuneration decision. For  2 [0.326; 0.65] the optimal contract is
performance-based, for  2 [0.65; 1] the optimal contract is a xed-compensation contract.
Obviously, tighter loss-oset restrictions might alter the algebraic sign of the principal's
objective functions. As a consequence, the principal should not oer a compensation
contract for  2 [0; 0.326].
7 Summary and conclusions
This paper analyzes the impact of symmetric and asymmetric taxation on the conclusion
and the design of remuneration contracts using a binary principal-agent model. I integrate
corporate taxation at the principal's level and wage taxation at the agent's level. The
principal chooses the optimal of three possible alternatives:
17 He does not oer a contract to the agent. This means that cooperation does not
occur and that the net prot equals zero.
 The principal can oer a xed-compensation contract, which induces the agent to
provide low (but positive) eort.
 The principal can oer a performance-based remuneration contract ensuring a high
eort by the agent.
Under symmetric taxation of prots and losses the corporate tax does not aect the con-
clusion and the optimal design of a compensation contract. The corporate tax just reduces
the principal's objective function proportionally and does not alter its algebraic sign. Un-
der asymmetric taxation, however, increasing the corporate tax potentially reduces the
net prot below zero. Hence, suciently tight loss-oset restrictions might prevent the
principal from oering a compensation contract. With respect to the choice between
xed and performance-based remuneration, asymmetric taxation penalizes xed-salary
contracts { which are equivalent to the rst-best case { more than performance-based
contracts, which induce a welfare loss compared to the rst-best case. This result implies
that loss-oset restrictions might aggravate ineciencies caused by suboptimal division
of risk. As a consequence, neglecting corporate taxation might provoke wrong decisions
only under asymmetric taxation.
In our model the agent's salary is always positive. Thus, loss-oset restrictions are irrel-
evant for the agent. The eects of the wage tax do not depend on whether or not the
corporation tax is symmetric. Increasing the wage tax rate always increases the agent's
gross salary and reduces the principal's net prot. Consequently, for suciently high
wage tax rates the principal's net prot after remuneration costs becomes negative and
the principal refrains from oering a contract. In a qualitative sense, this result does
not depend on whether the agent's reservation utility is a function of the wage tax. The
wage tax reduces employment in all the situations considered. Moreover, I show that the
wage tax penalizes performance-based contracts more heavily than xed-salary contracts.
Apart from its employment-reducing eects, the wage tax also reduces incentives for high
eort. Neglecting the wage tax might cause harmful decisions in any of the considered
cases.
In order to draw tax policy conclusions from our model, it has to be determined whether
tax policy should keep economic decisions unaected (neutral taxation) or whether it
should be used to reach a particular outcome (active tax policy). For neutral taxation,
the reference case is given by the pre-tax second-best case because the informational
asymmetry is simply taken as given. If the tax legislator were interested in neutral
taxation they should refrain from levying a wage tax and should realize tax revenue
exclusively by a symmetric corporate tax. This tax system would guarantee the same
remuneration contracts as in the pre-tax case.
As an alternative, an active tax policy could be designed to correct informational asym-
metries in order to reach the rst-best pre-tax solution, which serves as the appropriate
18reference case21. By comparing the rst-best pre-tax and the second-best after-tax solu-
tions, which tax parameters can be eectively used to reach a particular contract choice
or eort level, can be analyzed. Also in this case, the desired tax revenue should be
realized exclusively by a symmetric corporate tax. Moreover, for employment and eort
levels similar to the pre-tax rst-best case, subsidising employment contracts could be
necessary.
Given the distinctive tax eects derived in our model, its assumptions should be criti-
cally scrutinized in order to avoid premature tax policy conclusions. As a main caveat,
the model's binary structure potentially limits its explanatory power. However, it should
be noted that this discrete structure permits analytical solutions. The LEN model as
a possible alternative model with a continuous state space cannot be applied, because
asymmetric corporate taxation violates the linearity assumption22. Another limitation
arises from the model's one-period setting which requires time eects of taxation to be
approximated by tax rate eects. This assumption is conducive to analytical solvability.
Hitherto, multi-period principal-agent models including taxation do not exist23. There-
fore, the possible additional insights from this class of models are still unknown. In
any case, the extensive tax eects in the binary model indicate that neglecting taxation
requires strong arguments.
By contrast, the existence of analytical solutions is an argument in favor of investigating
open research questions using binary models. These open research questions include the
eects of bonus taxation at the agent's level or the eects of progressive income taxes for
both the principal and the agent24.
21Kanniainen (1999) investigates whether the corporation tax can correct failures in corporate gover-
nance.
22See Niemann (2008, p. 288 f.)
23See Sch ondube (2009) and the references cited there for multi-period agency models in the pre-tax
case.
24For the eects of progressive income taxation on risk taking see, for example, Ahsan (1974), Schneider
(1980), Bamberg/Richter (1984).




2;t < 0 ^ x1   u
2
1;t  0 ) Zs (a2) > Zs (a3):
Proof:
1.) From x2   u2
2;t < 0 ^ x1   u2
1;t  0 follows:
x2   u
2
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2.) From (24) follows:

























(x2   x1)(1   t) <



















3.) In order to show that condition (33) is more restrictive than condition (34), the




























































































































































Inequality (35) is always satised, because 0  L
2  1 is a probability. Hence, condition
(33) is always more restrictive than condition (34). Although it is possible that x2 u2
2;t < 0
^ x1   u2
1;t  0 occur, in this case Zs (a2) > Zs (a3) holds, so alternative a3 cannot be
optimal.
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